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THESIS
THE LIABILITY OF AN AGENT SIGNING NEGOTIABLE PAPER
--BY--
AARON JOSEPH COLNON
CORNELL UNIVERSITY -- SCHOOL OF LAW
1894

Probably there is no question in law to-day which
has called forth more opinions by eminent judges or
arguments from more able lawyers than the question as to
the liability of an agent signing or purporting to sign
for a principal, and it is certain that no question has
been more differently and, in my humble opinion, less
satisfactorily answered. It has in fact been answered
differently in many of the states, and in some one can
scarcely tell even now what the law is, so many opinions
differing in each particular having been handed down by
each succeeding judge on the same bench.
This is particularly true in regard to the presump-
tions raised by law as to the liability of a person
signing a negotiable instrument as agent for another.
2As one learned judge says, "The books are full of cases
on this refined subject and are overburdened with
elaborate learning not infrequently more nice than wise,
and show such embarrassing conflict of judicial opinion
that one in search of the law is well nigh tempted to
discard the whole that is wriuten and follow the dictates
of his own understanding." This is the subject I in-
tend to discuss and particularly the liability of one
signing for a corporation.
In the first place, I think all the courts have from
the beginning laid down rules altogether too strict and
arbitrary as to the liabilities of those persons. The
reason, it seems to me, is the fact that written con-
tracts were originally all formal and later when mercan-
tile contracts began to be in writing, although there was
an effort, and in fact it was successful, to a certain
extent, to be more lenient and do away with a large part
of the formality of the old contracts under seal and thus
broaden their usefulness, yet the courts have retained more
or less of the law of those instruments especially with
regard to negotiable instruments.
The two are yet much alike and in some ways to the
advantage of business usages, but in regard to the lia-
bility of agents the rule is too strict. In the case of
U. S. Bank vs. Lyman, 20 Vt. 666, Prentiss J. says,:
"Upon the whole it appears to me that the true rule of
law is that no person, although in fact a principal or
partner, can sue or be sued upon a bill or negotiable
note, unless he appear upon its face to be a party to
it. A promissory note,according to the expression of
very great judges, partakes in some manner of the nature
of a specialty importing a consideration and creating a
debt or duty by its own proper force. Being assignable
and passing by mere indorsement, it is necessary that the
parties to it should appear and be known by bare in-
spection of the writing, for it is on the credit of the
names appearing upon it that it obtains circulation.
It is for these qualities and on these considerations
that it is distinguished from simple contracts in general
and made subj ect to a different rule." This statement
expresses exactly the reason given for this rule by
judges and text writers. But on a closer examination is
this exactly true ? Is it always on the credit of the
persons named in the paper that it obtains circulation ?
In the case of a bank or a large corporation, this is
certainly not general]y so.
circulation ? Not because the cashier is a responsible
man personally but because he represents some one who is,
and the signer is known to be the authorized agent. Any
corporation business has to be carried on through an
agent and when paper is accepted from him in the regular
course of the corporate business, it seems absurd to
assume that he intended to give his personal note or
that it was accepted as such. In the state of Iowa
the very strict rule as to negotiable instruments pre-
vails, but recognizing the injustice of a strict en-
forcement of the same, the court has found a means of'
modifying it, till it can almost be said that no such
rule exists. The ground on which this is done is well
shown in the case of Lee vs. Percival, 52 N.W.Rep.543.
Then how does it obtain
A note was given to plaintiff in the ordinary course of
the business of the Herndon Natural Gas and Land Company,
signed F. A. Percival, President, Alex Hastie, Secretary.
Suit was brought against the signers, but they alleged
that if it was so signed that it was not the obligation
of the Company only, the manner of signing it was the
result of a mutual mistake, and asked that it be reformed
and made to express the true contract of the parties.
This was allowed by the Court of Equity, Judge Robinson
saying, "It is well settled in this State that a signa-
ture like those in question, renders the signer individu-
ally liable, the addition of words denoting an official
title being deemed a mere description of the person. It
is also the rule that parol evidence is not admissible
to show that such a signature was designed to bind the
corporation of which the person signing was an officer,
but that has no application to actions in equity where
the signature is alleged to be the result of a mistake
the correction of which is asked."
This plainly arrives at a just and fair interpreta-
tion but why should it be necessary to resort to a mere
technicality when the instrument could be interpreted
just as well in a court of law without the necessity of
having a technical reformation in a court of equity ?
It seems to me that the strictness of the rule at
common law in regard to the mode of execution extends
only to solemn instruments under seal. It does not reach
unsolemn instruments and especially commercial and mari-
time contracts. In regard to these the liability of
the principal is made to depend upon the fact that the
act was done in exercise and within the bounds of the
powers delegated and especially that it was the intent
of the parties that the principal and not the agent
should be bound and in ascertaining these facts as con-
nected with the execution of a written instrument it
should be held that parol testimony should be admissible
to prove who is the principal. New York and nearly all
the older states, except Maine, do allow that as far as
the original parties and those acquainted with the cir-
cuinstances are concerned, it is allowable to show who is
the principal, while Maine and some western states allow
no parol evidence to be introduced to make any one re-
sponsible whose name does not appear on the face of the
instrument, in most of which cases it would be most just
and equitable that it should be done.
But with regard to third parties who hold without
knowledge of the facts, the courts seem universal in ap-
plying a strict rule governing the liability of an agent,
and in order to relieve himself from liability he must
unequivocally make it appear on the face of the note
that he signs for another and no extrinsic evidence is
allowed under any circumstances to show otherwise. Why
should this be so ? Bigelow says : "A person is con-
structively given notice" of equities when he has knowl-
- edge of a preliminary fact or set of facts which would
suggest to the average man the existence of some ulterior
fact of importance. The preliminary fact puts him on
inquiry concerning the probable ulterior fact. If he
does not pursue the inquiry suggested, or if he pursues
it faithlessly, he is fixed with notice of it. He stands
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as if he knew it."
Why should not this rule apply when the addition of
cashier, agent, etc. is put to a person's signature
when it is the universal custom among both banks and
business men to accept such a signature as that of the
principal ? Yet plainly from many cases it is seen that
though an agent signing in that manner did not intend
to bind himself or that the person taking the note never
expected him to, yet he is held liable. This first per-
son should certainly not be able to get any better se-
curity than he bargained for, simply because the person
signing instead of writing the whole thing out abbreviat-
ed it in such a way that they and any business man of
ordinary intelligence would understand what the abbrevia-
Why should not a third person takingtion stood for.
the note be considered to have constructive notice just
the same ? The words President, agent, etc. must mean
something. If he does not know what they mean, why
should he not find out ? The law says though that such
an addition is just intended as a description and is
understood as such by holders of the note,
not reasonable.
But that is
The iact,on the other hand,is that
no one except one who is versed in the law of this sub-
ject ever understood it to be intended as a description,
and if they do not understand it that way, why should
the law presume that they do ? In case of Hodgson vs.
Dexter(l Cranch,264) John Marshall C.J. very aptly said
where the defendant had entered into a contract as agent
and described himself as such, "The official character
of the defendant is stated in the description of the
This it has been said might be occasioned by
a willingness in the defendant to describe himself by a
high and honorable title he then filled. This unques-
tionably is possible but is not the fair construction
to be placed on this part of the contract, becuase it
is not usual for gentlemen in their private concerns
to exhibit themselves in their official character."
3ut this is not the general construction put upon
such a signature and though it is rather presumptuous
for me to criticise what has been laid down by the most
eminent of judges, nevertheless, I do criticise on the
grounds, first, that no man should be able through a
technical rule of law to get more or less than he bar-
gained for; second, it is a usage of business which is
almost universal for an agent to sign paper which the law
parties.
would say bound him and yet he did not intend to bind
himself or the persons through whose hands it passes did
not think of him as principal, in fact, in many cases
if they had they would not have accepted the paper ;
third, a person taking negotiable paper should be pre-
sumed to have notice of this the same as other equities
when there is anything on the face of the paper to sug-
gest such a thing to an ordinary person.
Nevertheless, this reasoning has certainly not been
followed by most of the courts and though some cases
seem to have been decided in accord with it, others, and
in fact most of them, though not overruling, have found
aome distinguishing feature and ruled otherwise ; and
in fact the courts seem tending all the while to a more
strict interpretation of the contract as evinced on the
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face of tha negotiable instrument, while the doctrine of
the lenient interpretation of many of the older cases is
being discarded.
The old case of Mechanics Bank vs. Bank of Columbia,
5 Wharton 326, might be cited to illustrate how far the
courts have departed from old rules. The note read
"Mechanics Bank of Alexandria,July 121817.
Cashier of Branch Bank of the United States,Washing-
ton :-- Pay to the order of Phillip H. Minor amount of
discount made me,which I believe is seventeen thousand
six hundred and twenty-six dollars and five cents.
(Signed) Wm. Patton,Jun."
Here wdthout a word on the face of the note as to who
was the principal, it was allowed to be proved that
Patton was simply cashier, acting as agent for the Bank.
The Judge in his opinion said that" there would not be the
least question as to whether he could be tried as princi-
pal if the agent had put Cas. or Ca. after his name, but
that as there was nothing to show it, it is by no means
true, as contended in the argument, that the acts of the
agent derive their validity from professing on the face
of them to have been done in the exercise of the agency.
In the more solemn exercise of derivative powers as ap-
plied to the execution of instruments known to the corn-
mon law, rules of form have been prescr~ied. But in
the diversified exercise of the duties of a general agent
the liability of the principal depends upon the facts :
(1 That the acts were done in the exercise and(2 Within
the limits of the powers delegated. These facts are
necessarily inquirable into by a court and jury and this
inquiry is not confined to written instruments."
Again in the case of Baldwin vs. Bank of Newbury,
(1 Wallace, 234) the Judge cited the previous case with
approval and went to the extent in speaking of parol
evidence being admitted to prove whether the person
signing a negotiable paper was acting as agent or prin-
cipal, of saying "The same rule as applied to ordinary
simple contracts has since that time (time of decision in
Mechanics Bank vs. Bank of Columbia above) been fully
adopted by this court."
The latest case on this question in the United
States Court is Metcalf vs. Williams 104,U.S. 93. It
was a draft in this form :
"Alexandria, Va.,Oct. 2, 1875.
The First National Bank of Alexandria,Va.,pay to
the order of A.E. & C. E. Tilton,Seven Thousand Dollars.
(Signed) EP.Aistrop,Sec. W.G.Williams,V.Pres."
Judge Bradley said : "Where a person acts merely as
agent of another and signs papers in that capacity, that
is, signs them as agent and the party with whom he deals
has full knowledge of his agency and of the principal
for whom he acts an express disclosure of the princi-
pals named on the face of the papers or in the signature
is not essential to protect the agent from personal
liability". He further says, "It is unnecessary to de-
termine whether the form of the document in this case was
sufficient to charge innocent holders of the check with
notice of its character. The fact that it bore two of-
ficial signatures, that of the complainant as Vice Presi-
dent, and Aistrop as Secretary, is so unusual on the hy-
pothesis of its being an individual transaction, and
points so distinctly to an official origin, that it may
be very doubtful whether any could claim to be ignorant
of its true character."
This case goes farther in the right directi6n of jut
tice and according to business usages than any other late
case that I have been able to find, and it is to be re-
gretted that the last point was not involved. For
though he ends up by admitting that the ordinary rule
is that the adding of agent or some like term is only a
descriptio personae and would have no weight except with
persons acquainted with the circumstances. Still I thin
think that where paper was signed in that way and passed
through the hands of business men in the ordinary course
of business if it was to come before a federal court, the
court would go very far in taking into consideration the
business usages and the meaning an ordinary man would
give to such an addition.
there would certainly be a strong tendency to raise a
presumption of law that notice had been given, for al-
though many learned judges have said that such additions
are meant and understood to mean simply a description of
the person, Judge Bradley's opinion would lead one to
think that the court would not necessarily keep rigidly
to that rule.
The strongest argument for the strict rule of inter-
pretation, I think, is that a negotiable instrument is
used in a greater or less degree as a circulating medium
and as such should be as free from all conditions and un-
certainties as possible so as to fulfill in the highest
degree this mission. As one learned Judge puts it,
"A negotiable instrunent is like a traveler without
If a court would do this,
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luggage. "
But why should this be necessarily so ? There are
many things on a negotiable instrument which the law pre-
sunes gives notice to a holder which are much more unjust
and which do not have to appear on the face of the paper
even as clearly as this does in order to be presumed to
have given constructive notice. An old rule was to the
effect that if a note endorsed in blank was offered for
discount by an entire stranger, was dicounted without any
inquiry being made concerning this stranger, and it turn-
ed out that the note had been stolen or obtained fraud-
ulently, the Bank who discounted could not recover, and
these principles although denied for many years by the
courts, seem to be recognized again to a certain extent
in the late New York case of Vosburgh vs. Diefendorf,
119 N. Y., 357.
Why should not an acceptor of a note bearing Pres-
ident, Treasurer, or some like term after the signature,
be put upon inquiry as to the meaning of these words, if
he does not already know what they are intended for, and
if he does know why not be bound by them.
If this rule was adopted there would be no injustice
to any person. The paper would be in many instances
harder to circulate, but the inconvenience would fall on
the maker, and when a person finds an inconvenience in
doing a certain thing, he generally inquires into the
cause, and if it is not too much labor he remedies it.
This would be done by the maker of a note if it was
found that it did not circulate as well and was therefore
Of course it could be said that under theworth less.
present law if an agent has to pay one of his notes once,
he will probably afterwards know how to make one which
will bind his principal. But that is a pretty hard
way to learn and in most cases a very inequitable way,
and since negotiable instruments are drawn up by all
kinds of people educated and uneducated in the laws,
they should receive a liberal interpretation and not one
adapted to those instruments which all persons admit
themselves not learned in the law enough to make and
therefore leave to professional men to draw up.
Nevertheless, the administrators of justice have
not seen fit as yet to look at it this way but have laid
down much stricter rules in most of the states and in
England.
In New York there have been many cases decided on
the points in question, and the law, at least, for the
present, is well settled that a bona fide holder can
look to the agent for payment of the note if he has not
clearly shown on the face that he acts as agent and not
as principal. Just what the court has decided is suf-
ficient to show this has been up many times, though, and
has been answered in different cases somewhat different-
ly. Even as to cases between the original parties there
has been much litigation as to whether it can be shown
by parol evidence who is the principal in a negotiable
instrument. But that question, I think, has been dis-
posed of in the interests of justice and equity, and the
law is to-day that an agent can show by parol evidence
at all times between himself and the payee of the note,
the circumstances under which and understanding between
them as to the capacity in which he signed.
One of the oldest cases to be found in lew York
State directly on this point is the case of Taft vs.
Brewster, 9 Johnson, 334. A Bond was given by
A.B.&C. as trustees of the Baptist society of Richfield,
for a certain amount of money and signed "A.B.C.,
Trustees of Baptist Society, of Richfield" and sealed by
their private seals, held that they were indepentently
liable. The opinion is given per Curiam with no reason
for the decision and not a single case cited. This was
a very arbitrary ruling, it seems to me, or else the
court was very much influenced by the rules governing
other contracts in writing, and since at that early time
(1812) all contracts in writing were construed with much
the strictness of sealed instruments, it is not at all
singular that the true distinction between an ordinary
contract in writing and a negotiable note was to a cer-
tain extent overlooked and the note treated as any other
contract ; yet it is unfortunate since this case is cited
continually in later cases as settling the law forever
on this point.
The fact that Judges and lawyers generally did not
distinguish contracts in the form of negotiable instru-
ments from others in writing is plainly seen in the ear-
ly cases, for continually cases of ordinary written con-
tract are cited in these old cases both by the attorneys
and by the judges on points as to an agent's ability to t
bind his principal in a negotiable instrument andi vice
versa, and in not one of them is it intimated that there
is a difference between their liabilities.
The case of Pentz vs. Stanton, 10 Wendall, 271, is
a good example showing this and is cited continually in
later cases. The agent of a manufacturing establishment
drew a bill of exchange on a third person signing it
W. A. Pentz, Agent. It was held that the principal
could not be charged as the word "agent" was only a word
of description. Judge Sutherland in the opinion says
"The import and legal effect of a written instrument
must be gathered from the terms in which it is expressed
and this note must be considered as a separate security.
-No person in making a contract is considered to
be the agent of another unless he stipulates for his
principal by name stating his agency in the instrument
which'he signs, nor do I know an instance in the books
of an attempt to charge the person as the maker of a
written contract appearing to be signed by another unless
the signer professed to act by procuration or authority
and stated the same of the principal on whose behalf
he gave his signature. He also discusses at length
the question of the admissibility of parol evidence in
such cases to show the real character of the transaction
and holds it to be utterly incompetent. So that he
practically decides that there must appear on the face
of the paper who is the principal.
This cases is cited continually on the question of
an agent's liability signing negotiable papers, yet it
is perfectly plain that as to written instruments gener-
ally it states 'the law wrong, for it can now always be
shown by parol evidence, who is the principal in all
written instruments not under seal, and since it bases
its rulings at to the agent's liability in this particu-
lar instance on a wrong premise, why should the conclu-
sion arrived at be cited in support of later cases ?
It is not intimated by a single word in the opinion that
a negotiable note stands on any different ground than
any other instrument in writing, and no distinction
seems to have been made until much later cases.
The law as to the admissibility of parol evidence
to show who is the principal to a written contract
has changed, though, and it now, as I said above, allows
to be shown by parol who are the real parties to the
contract. This is also allowed between the original
parties or a person holding and knowing the circumstances
under which a negotiable instrument was given. But
the courts have not yet gone to the extent of saying
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that a person taking receives constructive notice where
it does not plainly on its face show who is the princi-
pal,
The first case in this state holding that a third
person with notice of the circumstances of the drawing
of the paper could not recover from the agent is that
of Hicks vs. Hinde, 9 Barbour 528. The agent drew a
draft on his principal and signed it "Hinde,agent"; the
draft was accepted by the third person with knowledge of
the circumstances. Held that this knowledge could be
proved by parol evidence and that Hinde was not liable on
the draft.
The case of the Bank of Genessee vs. Patchin Bank,
19 N. Y., 312, is in this same line. Here S. B. Stokes,
cashier of a bank sent to the plaintiff to be discounted
a bill of exchange payable to "S. B. Stokes, cash", in-
dorsed by him with the same addition to his signature
and inclosed in a letter dated at the banking house and
signed "S. B. Stokes, cash". The plaintiff Bank was ad-
vised at the time of discounting the bill that Stokes
was the cashier and that he had been directed to send
it in for discount. It was here held that it was the
indorsement of tne Bank and not of S. B. Stokes individu-
ally, because agency of the cashier was communicated to
the knowledge of the plaintiff as well as apparent, and
it is intimated that no other construction could be put
on the bill under any circumstances, even without in-
struction given in the, letter. Gray, J. says, "What
else could with any good reason be inferred from his
indorsement of the bill as cashier, inclosed as it was
in a letter dated at the Patchin Bank, subscribed as
cashier, than that the whole business was done in his
capacity as cashier of the Bank."
could be inferred.
Clearly nothing else
But I fail utterly myself to see
why anything more can be inferred from a letter dated
at the Patchin Bank with the addition of "Cash" to a
person's name, than from a draft, note or something else
dated and signed in the same manner. A person writes
a letter and after his narie adds"agent", he is not
thought for a moment to be the principal, yet when he
fills out a note or a draft in the same way, he is pre-
sumed to have meant that he signed as the principal.
There is certainly no logical reason for the distinction.
Justice Gray further says, "If the addition of
cashier was a mere description of the person and not of
the character in whicti he acted for the Bank, the plain-
tiffs acquired no title to the bill as against the de-
fendant. Suppose a controversy to have arisen between
the Patchen Bank and the plaintiff, as to the title of
the bill, no one, I apprehend, would seriously insist
that its indorsement by Stokes, with the addition of
cashier, did not pass the title, clearly if it would
be an official act binding upon the Bank in one case,
it is in the other, and if it was not intended to make
the Bank liable, the indorsement should have been without
recourse".
But the Justice after g:oing so far in a reasonable
way seems to have considered a little and adds in the
next sentence a qualification to this--- what he probably
thought too broad statement to be consistent with some of
the earlier cases--- to the effect that there is a dis-
tinction between Bank's notes and drafts and those of
another kind of corporation. But this, in my opinion,
is not at all just. If the cashier of a Bank whose very
business is that of discounting notes, etc. is able to
bind the corporation and leave himself free from liabili-
ty, how much greater reason is there for allowing an
agent of another corporation, whose knowledge of the law
of bills and notes is presumably much less than that of a
cashier, to be able to bind his principal when he intends
to, just the same as the cashier of a bank, and in his
endeavor to do so what form of note or draft could he
with more reason follow than that of a person whose very
business is the filling out and accepting of such paper.?
Or in other words, why should a cashier be allowed to
fill out a paper in this way and escape personal liabili-
ty and then turn around and accept paper from an agent
of another corporation signed in the same way, and yet
hold him personally liable ? There is no ground what-
ever on which to distinguish the two unless it be to
hold a cashier more strictly liable than the agent of
another corporation.
But it is unnecessary to discuss more cases on this
point as the law in this state plainly is, that generally
the addition to a signature of "agent","Pres.", "Cashier"
etc. is merely a descriptio personae, and means nothing
by itself unless it is shown that the holder of the note
knew the circumstances under which it was made.
It was even held in the C. N. Bank vs. Clark, 139
N. Y. 307, that where a note was made out on a blank
form, with the name ol tne corporation on the margin and
signed "John Clark, Pres.", "E.H. Close,Treas." they would
bind thanselves personally, although they never so in-
tended and the person to whom the note was made out did
not take it as theirs. But he discounted it at a
Bank and as the court held that there was not enough on
the face of the note to give notice, the unfortunate
agents had to pay.
Nothing, in my opinion, could be more unjust and
though there may be many reasons for keeping negotiable
paper distinct fran other written contracts in many ways,
yet I think that they would lose none of their usefulness
and in a very great majority of cases, would be more
conducive to justive, if the law presumed a constructive
notice to be given when a person added, "Presl,"Treas.,"
or some such title to his signature, which any ordinary
prudent man would be apt to inquire about.
Of course that particular paper mi 5-ht be less use-
ful, but if it was less useful it would be harder to
circulate and those who wished to circulate it would very
soon find the reason why and remedy it. Thus no one
would su-f fer hardship but those deserving it, and they
only a just amount.
But it is hardly likely that for years to come,
will this be the law, even if it ever is, so firmly has
this ruling been established by successive judges in
this country and in England, but justice though many
times slow, is not the less sure in courts of law; so in
this case surely sooner or later the injustice of the
present ruling will be seen and remedied.
